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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASES 
A. Nature of the Cases. 
The overarching question in these consolidated appeals is whether a license to practice 
law is a shield to liability for engaging in, and assisting in the commission of, tortious conduct. 
Among the issues presented are an attorney's liability for accepting payment from fbnds the 
attorney knows are subject to a security interest, whether an attorney purportedly representing a 
corporation may assist interested and confl~cted d~rectors in tortious conduct, and whether 
tortious conduct committed by an attorney during the course of purported representation is, as 
Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown successfully argued below, nothing Inore than zealous, and 
therefore lawful, representation. These appeals also address issues of first impression relating to 
clai~us against attorneys, defenses to claims against attorneys, and a creditor and stock pledgee's 
standing to assert direct and derivative claims. The facts and allegations are set forth in detail in 
Reed Taylor's respective Complaints and proposed Amended Cotnplaints. (R. Vol. I, pp. 1-23 
and 133-1 76; Vol. It, pp. 239-264 and 406-453.) 
B. Procedural History. 
On August 18, 2008, Reed Taylor filed complaints in district court of the Second Judicial 
District in Nez Perce County against Gary D. Babbitt, D. John Ashby, Patrick V. Collins, 
Richard A. Riley, and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LP (hereinafter collectively referred to as 
"Hawley Troxell") and Michael M. McNichols and Cle~nents Brown & McNichols, P.A. 
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "Clements Brown"). (R. Vol. I, p. 1; Vol. 11, p. 239.) 
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Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown moved to dismiss Reed Taylor's Complaints on September 
10,2008, and September 29, 2008, respectively. (R. Vol. I, p. 24; Vol. 11, p. 265.) 
On October 2,2008, the district court entered a stay of all discovery and no discovery has 
been taken in these actions.' (R. Vol. 11, pp. 3 15-18.) On October 16,2008, Reed Taylor moved 
to amend his Complaints and served proposed Amended Complaints, which such Amended 
Complaints more clearly detail the facts and specifically pled all elements necessary for every 
cause of action. (R. Vol. I, pp. 130-76; Vol. 11, pp. 403-53.) On October 17, 2008, the district 
court held consolidated hearings on Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown's Motions to Dismiss. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 7,ll. 2-18.) On December 4, 2008, the d ~ s t ~ i c t  court held consolidated hearings on 
Reed Taylor's Motions to Amend Complaint. (R. Vol. I, p. 188; Vol. 111, p. 468.) 
On December 23,2008, the district court granted Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown's 
Rule 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss and denied Reed Taylor's Motions to Amend. (R. Vol. I, p. 
188-205; Vol. 111, pp. 468-83.) On January 30, 2009, Reed Taylor filed Notices of Appeal in 
both actions. (R. Vol. I, p. 227; Vol. 111, p. 310.) On April 3, 2009, the district court awarded 
attorneys' fees to Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown. (Mot. Aug. R. pp. 00103-114 and 
00289-97.) On April 24, 2009, the district court entered judgments against Reed Taylor for 
$20,058 in each action. (Mot. Aug. R. pp. 001 15-17 and 00259-61.) On May 4, 2009, Reed 
Taylor moved for reconsideration of the award of any attorneys' fees, as had Hawley Troxell and 
Clements Brown. (Mot. Aug. R. pp. 001 18, 00133, 00278 and 00262.) 
' Although only entered in the Hawley Troxell case, no discovery took place in either action. 
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On May 15, 2009, Reed Taylor filed Amended Notices of Appeal to include the award of 
attorneys' fees and the Court instructed him to file a Motion to Augment Record. (Supp. Mot. 
Aug. R. pp. 00306 and 00314.) On June 1, 2009, the District Court entered an order dcnying 
Reed Taylor, Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown's Mot~ons for Reconsideration regarding the 
award of attorneys' fees. (Mot. Aug. R. pp. 00147-55 and 00289-97.) On June 4, 2009, Reed 
Taylor filed his Second Amended Notices of Appeal. (Mot. Aug. R. pp. 00156 and 00298.) 
C. Statement of Facts. 
Reed Taylor is a resident of Lewiston, Idaho and an elderly person as defined by I.C. $ 
48-608. (R. Vol. I, pp. 1 and 134; Vol. 11, pp. 239 and 407-08.) Clements Brown and Hawley 
Troxell are entities and attorneys engaged in the practice of law in Idaho. (R. Vol. I, pp. 1-2 and 
134; Vol. 11, pp. 240 and 407-08.) 
Reed Taylor is owed over $8.5 Million by AIA Services Corporation (hereinafter "& 
Services") through a $6 Million promissory note dated August 1, 1995 (hereinafter "$6M Note"). 
(R. Vol. I, pp. 3 and 135-36; Vol. 11, pp. 241 and 409-10.) As security for the payment of the 
$6M Note, AIA Services granted Reed Taylor the only security interest in d l  of the shares of 
stock of AIA Insurance, Inc. (hereinafter "AIA Insurai~ce") and gave him the irrevocable 
contractual right to vote the shares of AIA Insurance upon AIA Services' default in its 
contractual obligations to Reed Taylor. (R. VOI. I, pp. 3 and 142; Vol. 11, pp. 242 and 416.) 
Reed Taylor also held the only valid and perfected security interests in d l  of AIA Services and 
AIA Insurance's commissions and related receivables, i.e., all of the corporations' revenues. (R. 
Vol. I, pp. 3, 19 and 136; Vol. II., pp. 259-60 and 409-10.) Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown 
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had full knowledge of AIA Services contractual obligations owed to Reed Taylor. (R. Vol. I, pp. 
3 and 142; Vol. 11, pp. 241 and 415.) 
On August 1, 2005, the $6M Note matured and Reed Taylor provided written notice of 
default to AIA Services on December 12, 2006. (R. Vol. I, pp. 3 and 142; Vol. TI, pp. 241 and 
415.) On February 22, 2007, Reed Taylor voted all of the shares of AIA Insurance and 
attempted to take control of the corporation as provided by the contract documents and I.C. 5 30- 
1-722. (R. Vol. I, pp. 4 and 142-43; Vol. 11, pp. 242 and 416.) 
R. John Taylor (hereinafter "John Taylor"), James Beck, Michael Cashnlan, and other 
individuals are all past or present interested directors of AIA Services and AIA Insurance who 
have a vested interest in not pursuing claims against themselves or the attorneys unlawfully 
assisting them. (R. Vol. I, pp. 138-39; Vol. 11, pp. 41 1-13.) In taking directions from interested 
and not properly elected directors (John Taylor, Connie Taylor and James Beck), Hawley Troxell 
and Ciements Brown's representation is not, and could not, be in the best Interests of AIA 
Services and AIA Insurance, and exceeded any scope of representation. (R. Vol. I, pp. 7, 12-13 
and 140-41; Vol. 11, pp. 246-50 and 412-14.) Any purported legal representation waivers 
obtained by Clelnents Brown and Hawley Troxell were not obtained fiom authorized and 
disinterested directors of AIA Services and AIA Insurance. (R. Vol. I, pp. 7 and 139-41; Vol. If, 
pp. 246 and 412-14.) 
John Taylor, Connie Taylor, Jaines Beck, JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman are past and 
present directors and officers of the closely-held AIA Services and AIA Insurailce, they are all 
interested parties by way of their tortious acts and ownership of shares in CropUSA Insurance 
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Agency, Inc. ("CropUSA"), and any recovered funds should not be placed in their hands. (R. 
V O ~ .  I, p. 135; Vol. TI., p. 408-09.) 
In 2007, Reed Taylor filed a Complaint against AIA Services, AIA Insurance, CropUSA, 
John Taylor and other individual defendants for fraud, fraudulent conveyance, civil conspiracy, 
conversion, breaches of fiduciary duties and other claims (hereinafter "Taylor v. AIA Services, et 
al."). (R. Vol. I, p. 4; Vol. 11, p. 243.) In Taylor v. AIA Services, et al., Clements Brown 
undertook to represent three separate clients with irreconcilable conflicts of interest - AIA 
Services, AIA Insurance and R. John Taylor (an individual accused of misappropriating millions 
of dollars of the corporations' assets). (R. Vol. I, pp. 5 and 144.) As a result of Reed Taylor's 
assertions that the representation violated Rules of Professional Conduct (hereinafter ''W'), 
Clements Brown withdrew from representing AIA Services and AIA Insurance on March 28, 
2007. (R. Vol. I, pp. 5 and 145.) Shortly thereafter, in Taylor v. AIA Services, et al., Hawley 
Troxell undertook to represent two separate clients with irreconcilable conflicts of interest - AIA 
Services and AIA Insurance, and later appeared and represented a third corporate defendant, 
CropUSA. (R. Vol. 11, pp. 244-45 and 418-20.) 
Clements Brown and Hawley Troxell also unlawfully and inappropriately entered into a 
joint defense agreement along with AIA Services, AIA Insurance, CropUSA, John Taylor, James 
Beck, Connie Taylor, and other individual defendants accused of committing fraud, breaches of 
fiduciary duties and other torts against AIA Services, AIA Insurance and Reed Taylor. (R. Vo1. 
I, pp. 7-9, 18-19 and 146-50; Vol. 11, pp. 245-49, 258-59 and 419-23.) CropUSA, one of 
Hawley Troxell's purported three corporation clients, was the recipient of millions of dollars of 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 12 
funds fraudulently transferred from AIA Services and AIA Insurance and the recipient of an 
unlawful $15 Million loan guarantee by AIA Insurance. (R. Vol. I, pp. 13-15, 144, 160-62; Vol. 
11, pp. 243-44,253,417,433-36 and 426.) 
Clements Brown and Hawley Troxell have full knowledge of the millions of dollars of 
AIA Services and AIA Insurance's funds, assets and services that have been unlawfully 
transferred to CropUSA. (R. Vol. I, pp. 9, 12, 16-17 and 138; Vol. 11, pp. 249, 251, 255-57 and 
414.) With the full knowledge of Clements Brown and Hawley Troxell, the past and present 
purported board members of AIA Services and AIA Insurance have failed to conduct shareholder 
meetings, hiled to provide disclosure of transactions and facts to shareholders, and have 
continued to do so even after the Complaints were filed in this action. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 138-39; 
Vol. 11, p. 412.) 
During the course of their purported representation, Hawley Troxell and Clernents Brown 
attended and participated in inappropriate board meetings when they knew the boards were not 
properly seated and were comprised of interested directors, resulting in all such board resolutions 
and actions as being null and void, to include the decisions to hire Hawley Troxell and Clements 
Brown. (R. Vol. I, pp. 15-18, 40; Vol. 11, pp. 251-58.) In other words, Hawley Troxell and 
Clements Brown were knowingly taking actions in Taylor v. AZA Services, et a/., from 
unauthorized boards of directors who were not properly seated and who did not meet the 
requirements to be a board member under the corporations' bylaws. (R. Vol. I, pp. 17-18; Vol. 
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During the course of their purported representation, Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown 
accepted payments for fees in excess of hundreds of thousands of dollars and assisted interested 
and conflicted parties in unlawfully transferring and/or encumbering millions of dollars in assets 
belonging to AIA Services and AIA Insurance, and in making decisions that were not in the 
corporations' best interests. (R. Vol. I, pp. 3-22 and 406-52; Vol. 11, pp. 241-62 and 133-75.) In 
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct ("the RPC's"), Clements Brown and Hawley 
Troxell undertook to simultaneously represent multiple named parties without obtaining propcr 
consents. (R. Vol. I, pp. 8 and 144-45; Vol. 11, pp. 247 and 418-19.) Hawley Troxell and 
Clements Brown assisted and/or aided and abetted interested individuals and CropUSA in acts of 
fraud, fraudulent conveyances, conversion, civil conspiracy, and breaches of fiduciary duties and 
actions detrimental to AIA Services and AIA Insurance. (R. Vol. I, p. 10-1 I and 158-59; Vol. 11, 
p p  249-50 and 432-33.) 
During the course of their purported representation, Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown 
represented AIA Services and AIA Insurance at various times in which the district court entered 
an injunction against Reed Taylor from repossessing AIA Insurance and acting as its director and 
officer, with full knowledge that the assets and funds of AIA Insurance were being 
misappropriated and not safeguarded, i.e., counsel for the corporations should have required the 
interested insiders accused of fraud and other torts post sufficient security to protect the 
corporations. (R. Vol. I, pp. 16, 143, 155-56; Vol. 11, pp. 256, 416,428-29.) Unfortunately, the 
district court misinterpreted Reed Taylor's Complaints for torts as disenfranchised responses to 
"zealous representation." (R. Vol. I, pp. 188-206; Vol. 111, pp. 468-83.) 
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On July 21, 2008, Reed Taylor served derivative demand letters upon the purported 
boards of directors of AIA Services and AIA Insurance demanding the boards take appropriate 
action against Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown. (R. Vol. I, p. 138; Vol. 11, pp. 41 1-12.) No 
actions were taken by the purported boards of AIA Insurance and AIA Services. Id. 
On August 18, 2008, Reed Taylor filed Complaints against Hawley Troxell and Clements 
Brown asserting direct causes of action for fraud, conversion, breach of fiduciary duties, tortious 
interference, malpractice (mcluding third-party bencficiary), violations of I.C. § 48-601, et seq., 
and aiding and abetting and conspiring to assist others in the commission of torts. (R. Vol. I, pp. 
18-33; Vol. 11, pp. 258-64.) In his original Complaints, Reed Taylor assertcd that he was 
bringing certain claims directly against Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown and that he was not 
asserting derivative claims. (R. Vol. I. p. 2; Vol. 11, p. 3.) Reed Taylor also asserted that "all 
appliiable facts alleged.. .are inioporated by reference into each cause of action as necessary to 
support each such cause of action." (R. Vol. I, p. 1; Vol. 11, p. 239.) When he moved to amend 
his complaint, Reed Taylor also assertcd derivative actions. (R. Vol. I, pp. 136-37; Vol. 11, pp. 
414-15.) 
Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown filed Rule 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss Reed 
Taylor's Complaints for failure to stale a claim oil September 10, 2008, and September 29, 2008, 
respectively. (R. Vol. I, pp. 26-61; Vol. 11, pp. 267-99.) Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown 
filed Answers denying most of the factual allegations asserted by Reed Taylor in his Complaint 
on September 26, 2008, and October 1, 2008, respectively. (R. Vol. I, pp. 62-70; Vol. 11, pp. 
300-13.) 
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On October 9, 2009, Reed Taylor filed Responses in Opposition to Defendants' Motions 
to Dismiss. (R. Vol. I, pp. 72-129; Vol. 11, pp. 319-3758.) On October 16, 2008, Reed Taylor 
moved to amend his Complaints to bring derivative and direct claims. (R. Vol. I, pp. 130-76; 
Vol. 11, pp. 403-53.) In addition to clarifying and organizing Reed Taylor's previously pled 
causes of action, the proposed Amended Complaints pled derivative and dzrect causes of action 
and new causes of action. (R. Vol. I, pp. 130-76; Vol. 11, pp. 403-53.) 
On December 23, 2008, the district court, after considering matters outside of the record, 
granted Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown's Rule 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss and denied 
Reed Taylor's Motions to Amend. (R. Vol. I, pp. 188-205; Vol. 111, pp. 468-83.) In its Opinions 
and Orders, the district court painted a picture as though no improprieties or unlawful activities 
had taken place, considered matters outside of the record, failed to consider as true the factual 
allegations asserted by Reed Taylor and made factual findings that contradict the facts asserted in 
Reed Taylor's Complaints and proposed Amended Complaints. (R. VoI. I, pp. 188-206; Vol. 111, 
pp. 468-83.) In addition, the district court failed to address a number of legal authorities and 
arguments asserted by Reed Taylor and failed to address certain causes of action. Id. 
On January 6, 2009, Clements Brown and Hawley Troxell filed Memorandums of Costs 
and Attorneys' Fees. (Mot. Aug. R. pp. 00001-4 and 00173-78.) On January 20, 2009, Reed 
Taylor filed Motions to Disallow Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown's Request for Attorneys' 
Fees. (Mot. Aug. R. pp. 00027-56 and 00179-206.) 
On April 3, 2009, the district court awarded $20,000 in attomeys' fees to Hawley Troxell 
and $20,000 in attomeys' fees Clements Brown. (Mot. Aug. R. pp. 00103-14 and 00247-58.) In 
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its Opinions and Orders, the district court failed to address certain claims and failed to address 
the first impression issues, novel claims, and unsettled law involving Reed Taylor's causes of 
action. Id. On April 24, 2009, the district court entered judgments against Reed Taylor for 
$20,058 in each action. (Mot. Aug. R. pp. 00115-17 and 00259-61.) On May 4, 2009, Reed 
Taylor moved for reconsideration of the award of any attorneys' fees. (Mot. Aug. R. pp. 001 18- 
32 and 00262-77.) On June 1, 2009, the district court denied Reed Taylor's Motions for 
Reconsideration and again made factual findings that contradicted the facts asserted in Reed 
Taylor's Complainls. (Mot. Aug. R. pp. 00147-55 and 00289-297.) 
11. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Did the district court err when it failed to apply the required I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) standards? 
B. Did the district court err when it detennined Reed Taylor did not have standing to pursue 
direct and derivative causes of action against ~ a w l e ~  Troxell and Clements Brown? 
C. Did the district court e n  in dismissing Reed Taylor's Complaints and proposed Amended 
Complaints against Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6)? 
D. Assuming Idaho adopts the "litigation privilege" as a defense for attorneys, what is the 
scope of the defense and does it provide complete immunity for tort claims and claims 
pertaining to exceeding the scope of purported representation? 
E. Did the district court err when it refused to permit Reed Taylor to amend his Complaints? 
F. Did the district court err when it awarded attorneys' fees to Hawley Troxell and Clements 
Brown? 
G. In the event the Court reverses the district court's dismissal, should the Court decide all 
issues presented by Reed Taylor to prevent further appeals thereby permitting the speedy 
and efficient resolutio~l of the cases? 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 17 
111. ARGUMENTS 
A. Standards of Review. 
i. Standard of review for a dismissal pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). 
In reviewing a district court's order granting the motion to dismiss pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6), the standard of review is the same as that used in summary judgment. Gallagher v. 
State, 141 Idaho 665, 667, 115 P.3d 756, 758 (2005). "After viewing all facts and inferences 
from the record in favor of the nonmoving party, the Court will ask whether a claim for relief 
has been stated." Id,(citing Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 398, 987 P.2d 
300, 310 (1999)). "The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the 
party is 'entitled to offer evidence to support the claims."' Sumpter v. Holland Realty, Inc , 140 
Idaho 349, 351, 93 P.3d 680, 682 (2004) (quoting BHA Inv., Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 348, 350,63 
P.3d 474, 476 (2003)). Summary judgment must be denied if reasonable persons could reach 
d~ffering conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence presented. Iron Eagle 
Dev'f, L L C v Qzlality Design Sys , Inc , 138 Idaho 487,491,65 P.3d 509, 513 (2003). 
ii. Standard of review for denial of a motion to amend. 
"A [district] court's decision to allow the amendment of pleadings is reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion." Haywavd v. Valley Vista Care Corp., 136 Idaho 342, 345,33 P.3d 816,819 
(2001). To review an exercise of discretion; the Supreme Court applies a three factor test, which 
such factors are: 
(1)Whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether 
the trial court acted within the boundaries of this discretion and consistent with the legal 
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court 
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reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
McCann v. McCann, 138 Idaho 228,232,61 P.3d 585,589 (2002). 
iii. Standard of review for an award of attorney fees. 
"When an award of attorney fees depends on the interpretation of a statute, the standard 
of review for statutory interpretation applies." BECO Const. Co., Inc. v. J-U-B Engr 's, Inc., 145 
Idaho 719, 726, 184 P.3d 844, 851 (2008). "'The interpretation of a statute is a question of law 
over which the Idaho Supreme Court exercises free review."' Id. (quoting Carrier v. Lake Pend 
Oreille Sch. Dist. #84, 142 Idaho 804, 807, 134 P.3d 655, 658 (2006)). An award of attorney 
fees under I.C. 5 12-121 is addressed to the trial court's discretion. Turner v. Willis, 116 Idaho 
However, that discretion is not untrammeled. When reviewing an exercise of discretion, 
we inquire (1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2) 
whether the court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with 
any legal standards applicable to specific choices, and (3) whether the court reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason. Here, the critical question is whether the judge made 
his decision consistently with applicable legal standards. 
Needs v. State, 118 Idaho 207,208,795 P.2d 912,913 (Ct. App. 1990). 
iv. Reed Taylor may assert new arguments on appeal. 
The Court addresses for the first time on appeal issues not raised in the trial court from a 
dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim and constitutionality issues. Warren v. 
Sharp, 139 Idaho 599,602,83 P.3d 773,776 (2003) (rehearing denied (2004)). 
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B. The district court erred when it failed to applv the re~uired I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) 
standards. 
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court looks only at the pleadings, 
and all inferences are viewed in favor of the non-moving party. Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 
Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002). "The issue is not whether the plaintiff will 
ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Id. 
"Every reasonable intendment will be made to sustain a complaint against a motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim." Idaho Comm'n on Human Rzghts v. Campbell, 95 Idaho 215, 217, 
506 P.2d 112, 114 (1973). A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim 
unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his 
claims which would entitle him to relief. Wackevli v. Martindale, 82 Idaho 400, 404, 353 P.2d 
782, 784 (1960). 
The court should be especially reluctant to dismiss on the pleading where the asserted 
theory of liability is novel or unusual since it is important that such legal theories be 
explored and assayed in the light of actual facts, not a pleader's supposition. 
Stewart, 92 Idaho 526, 531, 446 P.2d 895, 900 (1968). "The motion to dismiss serves its most 
useful purpose where from the pleadings and documented proof available no controverted [act 
issue remains and only questions of law are to he decided." Stewart v Avrington Const. Co , 92 
Idaho 526, 531, 446 P.2d 895, 900 (1968) (citing Slzull v. Pilot Lqe Ins. Co., 313 F.2d 445, 447 
(5th Clr.)).. "The validity of a complaint is more properly tested by the summary judgment 
procedure of I.R.C.P. 56." Id. "When a court considers matters outside the pleadings, such 
motion must be treated as a  notion for summary judgment." Hayes v. Conway, 144 Idaho 503, 
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506-7, 163 P.3d 1215, 1218-19 (Ct. App. 2007); I.R.C.P. 12(b). 
Reed Taylor's Complaints and proposed Amended Complaints asserted numerous 
sufficiently pled causes of action. (R. Vol. I, pp. 1-23, 133-175 and 188-206; Vol. 11, pp. 239- 
264, 406-453 and 468-484.) The dlstrict court erred in not following Rule 12(b)(6) standards 
and in considering matters outside of the record and in not converting and disposing of the Rule 
12(b)(6) motions in accordance with Rule 56. (R. Vol. I, pp. 188-206; Vol. 111, pp. 468-83.) 
C. The district court erred when it determined Reed Taylor did not have standine to 
pursue direct and derivative causes of action against Hawley Troxell and Clements 
Brown. 
As legal theories pertaining to direct and derivative actions overlap or are discussed in 
more detail under certain standing arguments below, Reed Taylor incorporates by reference all of 
the below arguments into a single argument for purposes of brevity and thoroughness. Based 
upon the facts and arguments asserted below, the district court erred in dismissing Reed Taylor's 
Complaints and denying his Motions to Amend as he has standing under numerous theories. 
i. Reed Taylor has standing to assert claims against the attorneys. 
The issue of standing focuses on the party seeking rel~ef and not on the issues the party 
w~shes to have adjudicated, which may be based upon threatened harm as well as past injury. 
Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 772, 133 P.3d 1232, 1238 (2006). "An attorney can be liable 
to a nonclient, even an adversary in litigation, for fraud or deceit. Duty is not at issue, because 
wrong is intentional conduct." I Legal Malpractice § 6:7 (2008) (internal citations omitted) 
(emphasis added); see also Banco Popular North America v Gandi, 876 A.2d 253 (N.Y. 2005). 
"[A] lawyer is subject to liability to a...nonclient when a nonlawyer would be in similar 
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circumstances." Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers 5 56 (2008). This basis 
concept of lawyer liability is discussed in numerous Cornlnents in 5 56: 
If activities of a nonlawyer in the same circumstances would render the nonlawyer civilly 
liable or afford the nonlawyer a defense to liability, the same activities by a lawyer in the 
same circumstances generally render the lawyer liable.. . 
Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers 5 56 (2008), Comment b. 
When a lawyer advises or assists a client in acts that subject the client to civil liability to 
others, those others may seek to hold the lawyer liable along with or instead of the client. 
Whether a lawyer is liable depends on the elements of liability under the law upon which 
the claim of liability is predicated and may therefore turn on such facts as how the 
lawyer's acts contributed to the plaintiffs harm, what the lawyer knew or believed as to 
the relevant facts and law, the lawyer's intent, and how culpable the client's conduct is ... 
Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 56 (2008), Comment c. "A law firm is 
subject to civil liability for injury legally caused to a person by any wrongful act or omission of 
any principal or employee of the firm.. ." Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers 5 58 
(2008) ("When firm principals are personally liable vicariously, they are jointly and severally 
liable." Comment g.) 
Reed Taylor has sustained direct damages and injury to his collateral and security 
interests, and has standing to pursue claims against Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown for 
their torts and other claims. (R. Vol. I, pp. 1-23 and 133-175; Vol. 11, pp. 239-264 and 406-453.) 
ii. Reed Taylor has standing to pursue direct and derivative causes of action as 
the pledgee of all of AIA Insurance's shares. 
A stock pledgee has standing to bring direct claims against third parties. Aurora Credit 
Services, Inc. v. Liberty West Development, Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1280 (Utah 1998); Schumacher 
v. Schumacher, 469 N.W. 2d 793 (N.D. 1991); Gustafson v. Gustafsoiz, 734 P.2d 949, 953 
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(Wash. App. 1987); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Kerr, 637 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. N.C. 1986); 
Johnson v. Gilbert, 621 P.2d 916, 918 (Ariz. App. 1980) (overruled on other grounds); Empire 
Life Ins. Co. of America v. Valdak Corp, 468 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1972); 19 Am. Jur. 2d 
Corporations 5 2032 (2008); 12A Fletcher Cyc. Corp. 5 5651 (2008) ("The pledgee may file suit 
in equity to preserve the stock and to protect his or her interests, to the same extent. at least, as 
the pledgor ...) (emphasis added). Generally, shareholders must pursue claims derivatively, i.e., 
on behalf of the corporation. However, a well-recognized exception to this general rule is that a 
shareholder in a closely held corporation may file a direct action without bringing the claims 
derivatively in the name of the corporation. Steelman v. Mallory, 1 10 Idaho 5 10, 5 12-1 3, 7 16 
P.2d 1282, 1284-1285 (1986) ("we cannot agree with appellants' contention that this case should 
have been dismissed because it is a 'direct action' rather than a shareholder's derivative suit."). 
Since a pledgee has the rights of a shareholder, the pledgee has the shareholder's standing to 
pursue direct and derivative claims: 
... Under some authority, the analysis for determining whether a stockholder's action 
should be.. .direct or derivative turns on the determination of who suffered the alleged 
h- stockholder individually, and who would receive the 
benefit of recoverv or other remedy. 
... When a shareholder's complaint states a cause of action that is both direct and 
derivative, the shareholder may proceed with the direct action. 
18 C.J.S. Corporations 5 485 (2008) (internal citations omitted) (e~nphasis added). Moreover, 
I.C. 5 30-1-740, et seq., does not prohibit a pledgee of all of the outstanding shares of a 
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corporation from pursuing derivative  claim^.^ 
Reed Taylor pled that he was the pledgee of all the outstanding shares of AIA Insurance 
and has standing to pursue direct and derivative claims on behalf of AIA Insurance. (R. Vol. I, 
pp. 2-4 and 135-36; Vol. 11, pp. 241-42 and 409-10.) 
iii. Reed Taylor has standing to assert direct and derivative claims as a secured 
creditor of AIA Services and AIA Insurance. 
When an unauthorized disposition of collateral occurs, a secured creditor has standing to 
bring claims against third parties for conversion and other remedies. First Sec. Bank of Idaho, 
N.A. v. Absco Warehouse, Inc., 104 Idaho 853, 856-57, 664 P.2d 281, 284-285 (Ct. App. 1983) 
The rights of a secured creditor are extensive: 
In most cases when a debtor makes an unauthorized disposition of collateral, the security 
interest survives disposition of the collateral. In these cases, the secured party may 
repossess the collateral from the transferee or, in an appropriate case, maintain an action 
for conversion. The secured party may claim both any proceeds and the original 
collateral.. . . 
Where a sale of collateral is, with respect to the secured party, a conversion of the 
collateral,& of the one who sells, as well as on the part of 
the one who purchases, or to whom property is transferred, or a third party who exercises 
dominion over the collateral or its proceeds.. . 
79 C.J.S. Secured Transactions 5 157 (2008) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).3 
Reed Taylor's pled that he has security interests in the stock, commissions and related 
The ABA Official Comment to Sections 30-1-740 states: "[ijn the context of sections 30-1-740 through 30-1-747, 
beneficial owner means a person havinr a direct economic interest in the shares" (emphasis added). Reed Taylor is 
the only party with a direct economic interest in all of the outstanding shares of AIA Insurance as the only pledgeee 
in all of the shares are pledged as collateral to him for the payment of the over $8.5 Million owed to him. Moreover, 
as theonly secured creditor of the insolvent AIA Services, Reed Taylor is the only person having a direct economic 
interest in the coiporation. 
See also Sections III(C)(ii) and (iv), which are incdrpora~ed by reference herein. 
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receivables of AIA Insurance and the commissions and related receivables of AIA Services. (R. 
Vol. I, pp. 3, 19 and 135-37; Vol. 11, pp. 242, 259-60 and 409-10.) As such, he has standing to 
assert claims against Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown. 
iv. Reed Taylor has standing to assert d k c t  and derivative causes of action as a 
creditor of the insolvent AIA Services. 
A creditor of an insolvent corporation has standing to bring direct claims and claims on 
behalf of the corporation. In re MS55, Inc., 2008 W L  2358699 (D. Colo. 2008); Board of 
Trzlstees of Teamsters v. Foodtown, Inc., 296 F.3d 164, 170 (3rd Cir. 2002); Asarco LLC v. 
Americas Min. Corp., 382 B.R. 49 (S.D. Tex 2007). A creditor of an insolvent corporation has 
standing to assert derivative breach of fiduciary claims against directors and other direct non- 
fiduciary claims. North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. 
Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 99 (Del. Supr. 2007).~ 
Reed Taylor's Complaints and proposed Amended Complaints pled that he was a secured 
creditor of the insolvent AIA Services, holding a security interest in all commissions and related 
receivables, i.e., all of its  revenue^.^ (R. Vol. I, pp. 2-3, 7, 21-22 and 136-38; Vol. 11, pp. 241-42, 
262 and 409-10.) Taking these facts as true he has standing to assert claims herein. 
4 In Gheewalla, the court's rationale for limiting claiii~s for breach of fiduciary duty to derivative actions was to 
permit the directors the Geedom to enter into negotiations with creditors. Id. at 103. Here, Reed Taylor is not only a 
creditor of the insolventNA Services, but he is the only secured creditor entitled to all of the assets in priority of 
any other creditor-providing the basis for the Court to not follow Gheewallu and permit Reed Taylor to assert 
direct causes of action. 
The cases dealing with a creditor's right to bring derivative claims typically involve general creditors, rather than 
secured creditors like Reed Taylor, who have even more legal rights. 
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v. Reed Taylor has standing to assert direct and derivative causes of action as a 
shareholder and director of AIA Insurance and required director of AIA 
Services. 
A shareholder and director of a closely-held corporation has standing to bring direct 
claims. Steelman, 110 Idaho at 512-513,716 P.2d at 1284-1285. A director or officer may bring 
claims against other parties in a quasi-derivative action. Law of Corp. Offs. & Dirs.: Rts., Duties 
& Liabs. 5 9:27 (2008) (citing New York law). 
The pledgee may file suit in equity to preserve the stock and to protect his or her 
interests, to the same extent, at least, as the pledger.. .The pledgee is also interested in the 
preservation of the corporate property and in preventing it from passing out of the hands 
of the corporation.. . 
12A Fletcher Cyc. Corp. 5 5651 (2008) (emphasis added).6 
Reed Taylor's Complaints and proposed Amended Complaints pled that he was the only 
pledgee (shareholder under the above authority) and director of AIA Insurance and was required 
to be director of AIA Services. (R. Vol. I, pp. 2-4,21, 33 and 139-40; Vol. 11, pp. 241-42, 254- 
55,409 and 413-14.) Thus, he has standing to pursue claims 
D. The district court erred in dismissing Reed Taylor's Complaints and proposed 
Amended Complaints against Hawlev TroxeU and Clements Brown pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). 
Idaho is a notice pleading jurisdiction and Reed Taylor's Complaints and proposed 
Amended Complaints sufficiently pled causes of action against Hawley Troxell and Clements 
~ r o w n . ~  After establishing that Reed Taylor has standing in the foregoing section, he will now 
address the pleading sufficiency of the following direct and derivative causes of action: 
' See also Section III(C)(ii), which is incorporated by reference herein 
'See Section III(i3) above, which is incorporated by reference herein. 
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i. Reed Taylor sufficiently pled conversion. 
When an unauthorized disposition of collateral occurs, a secured creditor has standing to 
bring claims against third parties for conversion and other remedies. See e.g., First Sec. Bank of 
Idaho, N.A. v. Absco Warehouse, Inc., 104 Idaho 853, 856-57,664 P.2d 281,284-285 (Ct. App. 
1983); U S .  v. McCleskey Mills, Inc., 409 F.2d 121 6 (Ga. 1969). Property and proceeds subject 
to security interests may not be disposed of without consent of the secured party. I.C. 5 28-9- 
3 15. A secured creditor has the right to recover from the recipient of proceeds from a security 
interest: 
Where a sale of collateral is, with respect to the secured party, a conversion of the 
collateral, there is a conversion on the part of the one who sells, as well as on the part of 
the one who purchases, or to who117 property is transferred, or a third party who exercises 
dominion over the collateral or its proceeds.. . 
79 C.J.S. Secured Transactions 5 157 (2008) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added); see 
also Luzar v. Western Sur. Co., 107 Idaho 693, 692 P.2d 337 (1984); Lzlssier v. Mau Van 
Development, Inc., 667 P.2d 804, 814 (Hawaii App. 1983); Nelson v. Jones, 38 Idaho 664, 671, 
224 P. 435,438 (1924); Western Farm Sewice, Inc. v. Olsen, 90 P.3d 1053 (Wash. 2004) (when 
a debtor transfers collateral subject to a perfected security interest, the secured party may 
commence an action against the purchaser for conversion); In re Bailey, 197 F.3d 997, 1000 (9th 
Cir. 1999); Case Covp. v. Gehrke, 91 P.3d 362,365 (Ariz. App. 2004). 
The primary reason for bringing claims of conversion is that Hawley Troxell and 
Clements Brown have been accepting payments for attorneys' fees subject to Reed Taylor's 
traceable security interests in all of the revenues and certain assets of AIA Services and AIA 
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Insurance, whether direct security interests or traceable proceeds from security interests. Reed 
Taylor's Complaints and proposed Amended Complaints pled direct and derivative claims of 
conversion. (R. Vol. I, pp. 1-20, 133-59 and 160-62; Vol. 11, pp. 239-58 and 406-36.) 
ii. Reed Taylor sufficiently pled fraud and constructive fraud. 
Generally, the following nine elements in order to state a claim for fraud: 
(1) a statement or representation of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the 
speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker's intent that there be reliance; (6) the 
hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the statement; (7) reliance by the hearer; (8) justifiable 
reliance; and (9) resultant injury. 
Mannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 931, 155 P.3d 1166, 1170 (2007) (holding that 
misrepresentations and discrepancies in corporate financial statements precluded summary 
judgment in buyer's action for fraud). Idaho Courts have long recognized "constructive fraud" 
as an alternative cause of action to common law fraud. See e.g., Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., 
98 Idaho 266,561 P.2d 1299 (1977); McGhee v. McGhee, 82 Idaho 367,371,353 P.2d 760,762 
(1960) (recognizing constructive fraud as an alternative cause of action to fraud and that the 
requirement of pleading and proving all nine elements of fraud "is not the case"). 
Otherwise stated. "constructive fraud" arises by operation of law from a course of 
conduct which, if sanctioned by law, would secure an unconscionable advantage, 
irrespective of the existence or evidence of actual intent to defraud. Constructive fraud, 
sometimes called legal fraud, is nevertheless fraud, although it rests upon presumption 
and rests less upon W i v e  intent than does moral or actual fraud.. . . 
The conscience is not necessarily affected by it. Indeed, it has been said that constructive 
fraud generally involves a mere mistake of fact. It requires neither actual dishonesty nor 
intent to deceive, being a breach of legal or equitable duty that, irrespective of the moral 
guilt of the wrongdoer, the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive 
others, to injure public interests, or to violate public or private confidence. In its generic 
sense, constructive fraud comprises all acts, omissions, and concealments involving a 
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breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence that results in damage to another 
If there is any distinction to be found between the terms "constructive" and "legal" as 
applied to fraud, it probably amounts to this: Breach of a fiduciary relationshiu or of a 
contract ubenimae fidei is usuallv called "constructive fraud," whereas the term "legal 
fraud" is generally used to characterize a misrepresentation made without knowledge of 
its falsity. Constructive fraud mav result from reckless and heedless representations, 
although they are not made with a deliberate intent to deceive. 
37 Am. Jr. 2d Fraud and Deceit 3 9 (2007) (internal foot notes omitted) (emphasis added) 
Reed Taylor's Complaints andlor proposed Amended Complaints sufficiently pled direct 
and derivative claims for kaud and constructive fraud. (R. Vol. I, pp. 1-18, 21-22, 133-59 and 
164-66; Vol. 11, pp. 239-58,262-63,406-32 and 441-43.) 
iii. Reed Taylor sufficiently pled breaches of fiduciary duties. 
Evidence that an attorney has violated rules of ethics pertaining to dual representation is 
sufficient to support a claim that an attorney violated common-law fiduciary duty of loyalty. 
Hendvy v. Pelland, 73 F.3d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1996). A shareholder's allegations that a law firm's 
conflict of intercst representing two corporations is sufficient to state a claim for brcach of 
fiduciary duty against the law firm. Reis v. Barley, Snyder, Sen$ & Cohen LLC, 484 F. Supp.2d 
337 (E.D. Pa. 2007). The pleading requirements necessary to state a cause of action against a 
lawyer for aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duties is the sane  as against any other 
person or entity. In re Senior Cottages of America, LLC, 482 F.3d 997, 1007 (8th Cir. 2007), 
Adena, Inc. v. Cohn, 162 F. Supp.2d 351 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Cacciola v. Nellhaus, 733 N.E.2d 133 
(Mass. App. 2000). 
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Reed Taylor's claims for breach of fiduciary duties are three-fold: (1) claims brought 
directly against Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown for aiding and abetting or conspiring with 
others to breach fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor; (2) claims pertaining to breach of 
fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor as a third-party beneficiary; and (3) those claims brought 
directly and derivatively by Reed Taylor on behalf of AIA Services and AIA Insurance. Reed 
Taylor's Complaints and proposed Amended Complaints sufficielitly pled breaches of fiduciary 
duties. (R. Vol. I, pp. 1-18, 21-22, 133-59 and 171-73; Vol. 11, pp. 239-58, 262-63, 406-32 and 
448-50.) 
iv. Reed Taylor sufficiently pled tortious interference. 
The elements of a tortious interference claim are as follows: 
(a) Existence of a contract, (b) knowledge of tlie contract on the part of the defendant, (c) 
intentional interference causing a breach of the contract, and (d) injury to the plaintiff 
resulting from the breach. 
Jensen v. Westberg, 115 Idaho 1021, 1027, 772 P.2d 228,234 (1988). Employees and agents are 
third-parties when acting outside of their scope of authority. Houser v. City of Redmond, 586 
P.2d 482,485 (Wash. 1978). 
Reed Taylor's Complaints and proposed Amended Complaints sufficiently pled tortious 
interference. (R. Vol. I, pp. 1-19, 133-59 and 163-64; Vol. 11, pp. 239-59, 406-32,439-41.) The 
d~strict court erred in dismissing these clairns. (R. Vol. I, pp. 188-206; Vol. 111, pp. 468-83.) 
v. Reed Taylor sufficiently pled malpractice. 
The elements of a general legal malpractice action are: 
(a) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (b) the existence of a duty on the part 
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of the lawyer; (c) failure to perfonn the duty; and (d) the negligence of the lawyer must 
have been a proximate cause of the damage to the client. 
Harrideld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 136, 90 P.3d 884, 886 (2004). A derivative action may 
be commenced against an attorney of an entity for malpractice. Simmons v. Miller, 544 S.E. 2d 
666 (Va. 2001); Wolcott v. Ginsburg, 746 F.Supp. 11 13 (D.C. 1990). 
When a corporation is insolvent, attorneys also have special obligations to creditors. 
Willner '.v Fuel Distributors, Inc. v. Noreen, 882 P.2d 399, 406 (Alaska 1994). The lack of an 
attorney-client relationship does not preclude a finding of a fiduciary duty, which is an issue of 
fact for the jury. In re D.C. Equipment, Inc. v. Peshtigo National Bank, 112 B.R. 855,857 (W.D. 
Mich. 1990). 
The shareholder's individual claim based upon a contract between the corporation and 
another may be brought as a third-party beneficiary action, despite lack of privity 
between the plaintiff shareholder and the defendant, provided the shareholder is an 
intended beneficiary of the contract.. . 
12B Fletcher Cyc. Corp. 5 5921 (2008) (internal citations omitted) citing Vogel v. Reed Supply 
Co., 177 S.E. 2d 273,278 (N.C. 1970) (citations omitted). 
. . . [A]n attorney may owe a duty to a party who is not his or her client, but who is a third- 
party beneficiary to an agreement between the attorney and his or her client. 
Accordingly, third party liability of an attorney arising from representation of a client 
may be found to exist where the attorney is responsible for damage caused by his or her 
negligence to a person intended to be benefited by his or her performance irrespective of 
any lack of privity. Privity between an attorney and a non-client is not necessary for a 
duty to attach where the attorney had reason to foresee the specific harm which 
occurred.. . 
7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at Law 5 234 (2008) (internal citations omitted) 
Reed Taylor is the pledgee of all of the shares of AIA Insurance, and has voted the shares 
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pursuant to his contractual rights appointing himself the sole office and director. He is also the 
secured creditor of the insolvent AIA Services. For the same reasons articulated above in 
Section III(C), Reed Taylor has standing to pursue direct and derivative claims against Hawley 
Troxell and Clements Brown for malpractice. Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown knew that 
the assets of the corporations could be turned over to Reed Taylor at any time and should be held 
in trust for his benefit-thereby creating third-party beneficiary rights for Reed Taylor. 
Reed Taylor's Complaints and proposed Amended Complaints sufficiently pled direct 
and derivative claims for malpractice, and privity of contract is not required for derivative claims 
for malpractice if the Court finds that he may not assert direct claims. (R. Vol. I, pp. 1-18, 21- 
22, 133-59 and 166-68; Vol. 11, pp. 239-58, 262-63, 406-32 and 443-45.) The district court 
apparently never addressed Reed Taylor's derivative malpractice claims when it erroneously 
found that he did not have standing as a creditor or stock pledgee. (R. Vol. I, pp. 188-206; Vol. 
111, pp. 468-83.) Rather, the district court focused solely on the basis that, under Hurrigfeld, 
privity was a prerequisite to a malpractice claim. However, neither Hurrigfeld, nor any other 
Idaho case, involved facts even similar to those here, where the complaining party (Reed Taylor) 
was a stock pledgee and the sole secured creditor, and all of the corporate directors were alleged 
wrongdoers and would not take action. To the extent Hurvigfeld holds to the contrary to his 
direct claims, it should be overruled or an exception created to the rule stated therein. 
vi. Reed Taylor sufficient pled violations of I.C. 5 48-601, et seq. 
Idaho's Consumer Protection Act provides for various claims for unfair, improper or 
unconscionable methods, including those involving an elderly person. I.C. $ 5  48-601 through 
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608. Although never addressed in Idaho, other courts do not afford attorneys blanket immunity 
froin claims brought by opposing counsel under the unfair trade practices and consumer 
protection acts. See e.g., Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tagev, 952 A.2d 1, 20-21 (Conn. 2008); 
Buvns ex re1 Ofice of Public Guardian v. Hale and Dorv LLP, 445 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.Ct. Mass. 
2006); St. Paul Five and Marine Ins. Co. v. Ellis & Ellis, 262 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2001); Campos v. 
Bvooksbank, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1271 (D.Ct. N.M. 2000); Burnap v. Linnartz, 38 S.W.3d 612,619- 
20, (Tex. App. 2000). 
In Chapman, the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld a judgment against a debtor's 
attorney under the Unfair Trade Practices Act: 
However far the duty of an attorney to zealously represent his client extends. it 
necessarily falls short of the point at which the representation constitutes fraud on a third 
party or the assistance in the pernetration of such a fraud, whether by affirmative 
misrepresentations or knowing nondisclosures.. .rTlhis court's refusal to permit litigants 
to raise claims against opposing counsel under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices 
Act cannot be construed, as the defendant suggests, as affording blanket immunity to 
attorneys for tortious acts they commit against third warties while representing clients.. . 
Chapman, 952 A.2d I, 20-21 (internal citations omitted; emphasis added). 
Reed Taylor's Complaints and proposed Amended Complaints sufficiently pled several 
alternative claims under I.C. $ 48-601, et seq. (R. Vol. I, pp. 1-18, 20-21, 133-59, 168-71; Vol 
11, pp. 239-58, 261-62,406-32,446-48.) In the action against Clements Brown, the district court 
dismissed Reed Taylor's alternative claims under I.C. $48-601, et seq., by finding that he has no 
privity of contract under I.C. $ 48-608(1), without addressing the alternative violations or his 
derivative claim which would not require privity of contract. (R. Vol. 1, p. 202.) In the action 
against Hawley Troxell, the district coui-t failed to even address Reed Taylor's claims under 1.C 
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5 48-601, et seq. (R. Vol. 111, 468-83.) The district court erred in d~smissing these claims. (R. 
Vol. I, pp. 188-206; Vol. 111, pp. 468-83.) 
vii. Reed Taylor sufficiently pled excessive compensation/waste. 
To maintain a claim for excessive compensation, a plaintiff need only show that the 
board lacked independence or the board lacked good faith. In re Tyson Foods, Inc., 919 A.2d 
563,589 (Del. 2007); Marcus v. Lincolnshire Mgmt., Inc., 409 F.Supp.2d 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
Reed Taylor's proposed Amended Complaints sufficiently pled excessive 
compensation/waste (e.g., aiding and abetting others in the commission of excessive 
compensation claim). (R. Vol. I, pp. 133-59 and 173-74; Vol. 11, pp. 406-32 and 450-51.) The 
district court never addressed Reed Taylor's excessive compensation claims. (R. Vol. I, pp. 188- 
206; Vol. 111, pp. 468-83.) 
viii. Reed Taylor sufficiently pled aiding and abetting in the commission of torts. 
Idaho law is well settled that those who aid, abet, counsel or encourage a wrongdoer by 
looks, signs, words, or gestures are equally liable to the injured party. See Todd v. Sullivan 
Const. LLC, 146 Idaho 118, 191 P.3d 196 (2008) (emphasis added). Similarly, attorneys are 
liable for the aiding and abetting of constructive fraud. See Hearst v. Hearst, 50 A.D. 3d 959. 
Like normal tortfeasors, attorneys may be liable to others under various legal theories, 
including aiding and abetting and other torts. Hearst, 50 A.D. 3d 959.; In re MS55, Inc., 2007 
WL 2669150 (D. Colo. 2007); Traub v. Washington, 591 S.E. 2d 382 (Ga. App. 2003); Adena, 
Inc. v Cohn, 162 F. Supp.2d 351 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Cacciola v. Nellhaus, 733 N.E.2d 133 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 2000); In In re MS55, the court held that the plaintiff pled claims against attorneys: 
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... I find Trustee sufficiently alleged the following claims on behalf of the cornoration's 
creditors: (1) [attorney defendantsl engaged in a civil conspiracy with Leach, Blue Chip, 
Akainai, and members of Debtor's management to commit fraudulent transfers that 
breached fiduciary duties to unsecured creditors; and (2) [attorney defendantsl aided and 
abetted Debtor's officers and directors in breaching their fiduciary duties to unsecured 
creditors. Thus, I find the bankruptcy judge's determination that Trustee's allegation only 
supported "clainis of the debtor against a third party" was in error. 
In ue MS55, 2007 W L  2669150 * 9 (emphasis added). In Adena, the court held that claims could 
be brought against attorneys: 
To establish a claim of aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must 
show: ( I )  a breach of fiduciary duty owed to another; (2) knowledge of the breach by the 
aider or abettor; and (3) substantial assistance or encouragement by the aider or abettor in 
effecting that breach. The court.. .did not require the direct and knowing participation 
that the Defendants contend 1s required. Rather, the court allowed the claim to procecd 
based upon a showing of "substantial assistance or encouragement." Moreover, even if 
such a heightened involvement were required, the Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that the 
rattorneyl Defendants were indeed knowing and active participants in Malecki's breach. 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a claim of aiding and abetting a breach 
of fiduciary duty against the [attorney1 Defendants. 
Id., 162 F.Supp.2d at 357-358 (emphasis added). 
Reed Taylor's Coniplaints and proposed Amended Coiiiplaints pled aiding and abetting 
in the commission of torts. (R. Vol. I, pp. 1-23 and 133-75; Vol. 11, pp. 239-64,262-63 and 406- 
52.) The district court erred when it ignored and never addressed the extensive authorities cited 
by Reed Taylor, including the analogous cases cited above. (R. Vol. I, pp. 188-206; Vol. 111, pp. 
468-83.) 
ix. Reed Taylor sufficiently pled civil conspiracy in the commission of torts. 
Idaho law is well settled on claims for civil conspiracy and the minimal pleading 
requirements. Argonatlt Insurance Conzpany v. White, 86 Idaho 374, 379, 386 P.2d 964, 966 
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(1963); Kloppenbttrg v. Mays, 60 Idaho 19, 88 P.2d 513 (1939) (an agreement becomes a 
conspiracy when its purpose is to do something that is unlawful or some lawful thing in an 
unlawful manner). Attorneys are also subject to liability for claims of civil conspiracy. Tmub v. 
Washington, 591 S.E. 2d 382, 387 (Ga. App. 2003); Bunco Popz~lar North America v. Gandi, 
876 A.2d 253 (N.Y. 2005) (recognizing a cause of action for a conspiracy); see also Resolution 
Trust Corp. v. Heiserman, 898 P.2d 1049, 1056 (Colo. 1995) (noting that a breach of fiduciary 
duty is an act associated with civil conspiracy). 
The prime distinction between civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting is that a 
conspiracy involves an agreement to ~ a r t i c i ~ a t e  in a wrongful activity or to commit a 
tortious act, while aiding and abetting focuses on whether a defendant knowingly gives 
'substantial assistance' to someone who performs wrongful conduct, not on whether the 
defendant agrees to join the wrongful conduct. 
15A C.J.S. Conspiracy § 3 (2008) (emphasis added). In order for more than one party to enter 
into a joint defense or common interest doctrine, each party must be represented by separate 
counsel. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 213 B.R. 433 (1997); 
Restatement (Third) Law Governing Lawyers § 76 (2000). Reed Taylor asserted that separate 
counsel was not retained and the joint defense agreements were improper and unlawful.* (R. 
Vol. I, pp. 6-9, 17, and 146; Vol. 11, pp. 247-48, and 420-21.) 
Reed Taylor's Complaints and proposed Amended Complaints sufficiently pled civil 
conspiracy in the commission of torts. (R. Vol. I, pp. 1-23 and 133-75; Vol. 11, pp. 239-64,262- 
Joint defense or con~mon interest agreements are generally not discoverable, however, Hawley Troxell and 
Clements Brown provided copies of the agreements to testifyiilg experts thereby waiving attorney-client privilege. 
See e.g., CP Kelco U.S. Inc. v. Phannacia Corp., 213 F.R.D. 176 (D. Del. 2003). (R. Vol. I, pp. 21 1-22; Vol. 111, pp. 
489-99.) This makes the issue of attorney-client privilege moot and the Court should order the documents produced. 
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63 and 406-52.)9 The potential issue of attorney-client privilege pertaining to the purportedly 
privileged documents is moot. However, even if such agreements did not exist, Reed Taylor also 
asserted that Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown inappropriately attended and participated in 
board meetings thereby assisting others in the coinmission of torts. (R. Vol. I, pp. 17, 144 and 
155; Vol. 11, pp. 257-58,412 and 430.) 
E. Assuming Idaho adopts the "litigation privilege" as a defense for attorneys, it does 
not provide complete immunity for tort claims and claims pertaining to exceeding 
the scope of purported representation. 
In the Opinions and Orders dismissing Reed Taylor's Complaints, the district court relied 
heavily on the so-called "litigation privilege," although it "found no Idaho case law addressing 
the doctrine" and that the defense "was a doctrine that has yet to be addressed by Idaho's 
appellate courts." (R. Vol. I, p. 194; Vol. 111, p. 474.) Reed Taylor asserts that the litigation 
privilege defense, if adopted, should not provide a license for an attorney to commit torts or take 
other inappropriate actions, and the scope of immunity it provides should not be unlimited. 
Attorneys are liable for acts and torts committed outside the scope of their representation 
because the law does not provide absolute immunity. Alpert v. Cvain, Caton & James P.C., 178 
S.W. 3d 398 (Tex. App. 2005) (attorney liable for fraud committed outside the scope of 
representation). Here, Reed Taylor pled numerous caused of action, including, conversion, 
which have no relevance to the litigation privilege defense's scope of representation. (R. Vol. I, 
pp. 18-22 and 160-69; Vol. 11, pp. 258-62 and 432-50.) Moreover, Reed Taylor specifically pled 
At the initial pleading stage of these actions, Reed Taylor's conspiracy claim adminedly falls on the legality and/or 
contents of the purported joint defense agreements and facts centered around the representation of individuals 
instead of the corporations through the agreements, facts or agreements occurring at unauthorized board meetingsin 
which the attorneys participated, and possible unknown facts asno discovery has been coi~ducted in either action. 
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that Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown exceeded their scope of representation. (R. Vol. I, pp. 
139-40; Vo. 11, pp. 413-14.) These pled facts, which must be accepted as true, defeat a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion. 
F. The district court erred by not permitting Reed Taylor to file amended complaints. 
The twin purposes behind the court rule govcrning amendments to pleadings "are to 
allow claims to be determined on the merits rather than on technicalities, and to make pleadings 
serve the limited role of providing notice of the nature of the claim and the facts at issue." 
Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 871, 993 P.2d 1197, 1202 (1999). If a 
"complaint is capable of being amended to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, a 
refksal to grant permission to amend would deprive a plaintiff of a substantial right." 
Marlutallev v. Markstaller, 80 Idaho 129, 135, 326 P.2d 994, 997 (1958). "As long as the 
proposed amendment states a valid claim, a court may not consider the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting the proposed claim." Christensen Family Trust, 133 Idaho at 872,993 P.2d 
at 1203 (citing Dufin v. Idaho lmpvovement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1013, 895 P.2d 1195, 1206 
(1995)). "Great liberty should be shown in allowing amendments to pleadiilgs in furtherance of 
justice between parties." Smith v. Shinn, 82 Idaho 141, 149,350 P.2d 348,352 (1960). 
Reed Taylor's proposed Amended Complaints pled valid causes of action as set forth 
above. (R. Vol. I, pp. 158-74; Vol. 11, pp. 432-51.) The district court erred by not permitting 
hiin to file his Amended Complaints and by considering the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting his Amended Complaints. (R. Vol. I, pp. 188-206; Vol. 111, pp. 468-83.) 
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G. The district court erred in awarding fees to Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown. 
It is error to award attorney fees for pursuing an action frivolously simply because an 
action is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Werlinger v. 
State, 117 Idaho 47, 50, 785 P.2d 172, 175 (Ct. App. 1990). It is an abuse of discretion for a 
court to predicate an award of attorneys' fees on matters not contained in the record. Severson v. 
Hermann, 116 Idaho 497,499,777 P.2d 269,271 (1989). The district court abused its discretion 
and misapplied or failed to apply the proper law. The award of fees should be reversed. 
i. If the Court reversed the district court's dismissal of one or more of Reed 
Taylor's actions, the award of attorneys' fees must he vacated as well. 
If the Court reverses the dismissal of an action by the district court, an award of 
attorneys' fees must also be vacated. Davis v. Professional Business Services, Inc., 109 Idaho 
810, 816, 712 P.2d 51 1, 517 (1985). Thus, if the Court reversed the dismissal of Reed Taylor's 
Complaints against Hawley Troxell andlor Clements Brown, the award of fees must be vacated. 
ii. The district court erred in finding Reed Taylor's entire cases were frivolous. 
A court may only award attorneys fees under I.C. $ 12-121 "only when it finds, from the 
facts presented to it, that the case was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably 
or without foundation ..." I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l); DesFosses v. DesFosses, 122 Idaho 634, 638, 836 
P.2d 1095, 1099 (1992) (emphasis added). "The district court should evaluate whether 'aJ 
claims brought. ..are frivolous or without foundation' before awarding attorney fees under I.C. $ 
12-121." Puckcett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 170, 158 P.3d 937, 946 (2007) (quoting Bingham v. 
Montane Resource Assocs., 133 Idaho 420,427,987 P.2d 1035, 1042 (1999)) (emphasis added). 
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The district court erred when it found that Reed Taylor's entire actions were brought and 
pursued frivolously. Based upon the legal authorities cited in this Brief, Reed Taylor's Motions 
to Disallow Fees and his Motions for Reconsideration, it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that 
all claims brought by Reed Taylor were frivolous. (R. Vol. I, pp. 72-128; R. Vol. 11, pp. 319-74; 
Mot. Aug. R. pp. 00027-55,00118-131,00179-205 and 00262-76.) 
iii. The district court erred in awarding fees under I.C. 5 12-121 when Reed 
Taylor asserted claims and issues of first impression, novel claims, and 
claims involving unsettled law. 
Where a case involves a novel legal question or issues of first impression, attorneys fees 
should not be awarded under I.C. 12-121. Campbell v. Kildew, 141 Idaho 640, 115 P.3d 731 
(2005). In Campbell, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of an award of 
attorneys' fees pursuant to I.C. 5 12-121 : 
... the district court.. .noted that this case involved novel issues, including a matter of first 
impression.. . Where a case involves a novel question, attorney fees should not be granted. 
Id. at 651, 115 P.3d 742 (emphasis added). Attorney fees are not properly awarded under I.C. 5 
12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) when unsettled or conflicting issues of law are raised. Hanf v. 
Syringa Realty, Inc., 120 Idaho 364, 370, 816 P.2d 320,326 (1991). 
The Court has never addressed the novel, first impression, and unsettled legal issues 
addressed in Reed Taylor's Complaints and proposed Amended Complaints addressed in these 
appeals, including, without limitation: (1) whether a party can pursue claims against opposing 
counsel; (2) whether a stock pledgee or secured creditor of an insolvent corporation can pursue 
direct andlor derivative claims on behalf of corporations; (3) whether an attorney can lawfully 
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accept paynent of fees from funds the attorneys knows is  subject to security interests; (4) 
whether an attorney can aid and abet or conspire with others to commit torts; (5) whether an 
elderly person can bring claims against opposing counsel under I.C. 5 48-601, et seq.; (6) 
whether an attorney owes third-party obligations to non-clients. Moreover, the conflicting 
authorities cited by all parties, including the district court, demonstrate that the law is unsettled 
on various issues. (R. Vol. I, pp. 72-128; R. Vol. 11, pp. 319-74; Mot. Aug. R. pp. 00027-55, 
001 18-13 1,00179-205 and 00262-76.) 
Any one of the foregoing issues is sufficient basis for Reed Taylor to defeat a request for 
fees pursuant to I.C. 5 12-121, and the district court erred in awarding them. 
iv. The district court erred in awarding fees under 1.C. 12-121 when it applied 
the "litigation privilege" - a first impression defense. 
Where a case involves a novel legal question or issues of first impression, attorneys fees 
should not be awarded under I.C. 5 12-121. Campbell, 141 Idaho 640, 115 P.3d 731. 
When the district court dismissed Reed Taylor's Complaints in part based upon the 
litigation privilege, the district court acknowledged that it "found no Idaho case law addressing 
the doctrine" and that it "was a doctrine that has yet to be addressed by Idaho's appellate courts." 
(R. Vol. 1, p. 194; Vol. 111, p. 474.) An issue of first impression bars an award of fees under I.C. 
5 12-12], Campbell, 141 Idaho 640, 115 P.3d 731. (Mot. Aug. R. pp. 00127 (n. 8), 00147-154, 
00271 (n. 8) and 00289-96.) The district court erred in awarding fees under I.C. 5 12-121 on this 
basis alone as the defense has never been addressed by the Idaho appellate courts. 
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v. The district court erred in awarding fees under I.C. 9 30-1-746. 
Attorney fees awarded under I.C. 5 30-1-746 are discretionary. McCann v. McCann, 138 
Idaho 228,61 P.3d 585 (2002). Under I.C. 5 30-1-746, the court may: 
(2) Order the plaintiff to pay any defendant's reasonable expenses, including counsel 
fees, incurred in defending the proceeding if it finds the proceeding was commenced or 
maintained without reasonable cause or for an improper purpose; or 
(3) Order a party to pay an opposing party's reasonable expenses, including counsel 
fees.. .if it finds the pleading.. . was not well grounded in fact.. .or warranted by existing 
law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law 
and was interposed for an improper purpose ... 
I.C. 5 30-1-746(2) and (3). The ABA Official Comment to LC. 5 30-1-746 "follows generally 
the provisions of rule 1 1  of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 746(3) will not be 
necessary in states which already have a counterpart to rule 11 ." Id. 
As an initial matter, when the district court found that Reed Taylor had no standing to 
pursue derivative actions, it could not award fees under I.C. 5 30-1-746 as he was not a member 
of the stated class of parties with standing. Moreover, since Reed Taylor's claims were not 
brought in violation of Rule 11 and were not frivolous, the district court should not have awarded 
fees under I.C. 5 30-1-746. (Mot. Aug. R. pp. 001 11-12 and 00255-57.) 
vi. The district court erred in awarding fees under I.C. 5 48-608. 
"The court in its discretion may award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant if it finds 
that the plaintiffs action is spurious or brought for harassment purposes only." I.C. 5 48-608(5). 
"Spurious" is defined as "[dleceptively suggesting an erroneous origin ...[ o]f doubtful or low 
quality ..." Black's Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition (1999), p. 141 1. "Harassment" is defined 
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as "[w]ords, conduct, or action (usu. Repeated or persistent) that, being directed at a specific 
person, annoys, alanns, or causes substantial emotional d~stress in that person and serves no 
legitimate purpose." Black's Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition (1999), p. 721. 
Reed Taylor is an elderly person who has been stripped of his income and the prospects 
of being paid under his $6M Note. (R. Vol. I, pp. 20-21 and 168-71; Vol. 11, pp. 261-62 and 
446-48.) As indicated in this Brief, Reed Taylor's Complaints and proposed Amended 
Complaints, Reed Taylor did not pursue his claims under I.C. 5 48-608 in a spurious manner or 
for harassment purposes, and the district court made no such finding. (Mot. Aug. R. p. 001 12 
and 00256.) 
vii. The district court erred in awarding fees because Hawley Troxell and 
Clements Brown failed to segregate fees. 
Fees are properly denied if the claimant fails to segregate fees between covered an 
uncovered claims. Brooks v. Gigray Ranches, 128 Idaho 72, 79, 910 P.2d 744, 751 (1996). 
Here, both Hawley Troxell and Clernents Brown failed to segregate fees between claims brought 
under common law and those brought under I.C. $ 5  48-608 and 30-1-746. (Mot. Aug. R. pp. 
00005-26, 00131, 00165-177 and 00275.) Consequently, the district court erred in awarding fees 
under that authority. 
H. The Court should render opinions on all of the above issues to prevent further 
appeals. 
The Court should rule on all issues on appeal to save judicial time and resources and to 
prevent other appeals and result in a speedy resolution. In re Estate ofKeeven, 110 Idaho 452, 
456-57, 716 P.2d 1224, 1228-29 (1986). Thus, the Court should rule on all issues raised to 
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promote judicial economy and prevent further appeals which would likely delay timely final 
decisions on the merits, should the Court reverse the district court's dismissal of these actions.I0 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons articulated above, attorneys do not have a license to commit torts and take 
property or money belonging to others without bearing any responsibility or liability for their 
actions. The Court should reverse the District Court's dismissal of Reed Taylor's Complaints 
against Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown, reverse the denial of his Motions to Amend, and 
reverse the award of attorneys' fees. 
DATED this 25" dav June. 2009. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
'O For example, if the Court reversed for considering matters outside the pleadings, then the district court could 
nevertheless grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion based upon lack of standing and the "litigation privilege." Thus, judicial 
economy would be served by deciding all legal issues raised in these appeals. 
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